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Abstract
PPAD refers to a class of computational problems for which solutions are
guaranteed to exist due to a specific combinatorial principle. The most well-
known such problem is that of computing a Nash equilibrium of a game. Other
examples include the search for market equilibria, and envy-free allocations
in the context of cake-cutting. A problem is said to be complete for PPAD
if it belongs to PPAD and can be shown to constitute one of the hardest
computational challenges within that class.
In this paper, I give a relatively informal overview of the proofs used in
the PPAD-completeness results. The focus is on the mixed Nash equilibria
guaranteed to exist by Nash’s theorem. I also give an overview of some recent
work that uses these ideas to show PSPACE-completeness for the computation
of specific equilibria found by homotopy methods. I give a brief introduction
to related problems of searching for market equilibria.
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1 Total Search Problems
Suppose that you enter a maze without knowing anything in advance about its
internal structure. Let us assume that it has only one entrance. To solve the maze,
we do not ask to find some central chamber whose existence has been promised by the
designer. Instead you need to find either a dead end, or else a place where the path
splits, giving you a choice of which way to go; see Figure 1. Observe that this kind
of solution is guaranteed to exist, and does not require any kind of promise. This is
because, if there are no places where the explorer has a choice, then the interior of
the maze (at least, the parts accessible from the entrance) is, topologically, a single
path leading to a dead end. If you are asked to find either a dead end or a split
of a path, this is informally an example of a (syntactic) total search problem — the
problem description has been set up so as to guarantee that there exists a solution;
the word “total” refers to the fact that every problem instance has a solution.
A maze of the sort in Figure 1 could of course be solved in linear time by checking
each location. Consider now a more challenging problem defined as follows:
Definition 1.1 Circuit maze is a search problem on a 2n × 2n grid — the maze
is specified using a boolean circuit C that takes as input a bit string of length O(n)
that represents the location (coordinates) of a possible wall or barrier between 2
adjacent grid points. C has a single output bit that indicates whether in fact a
barrier exists at that location.
1This paper accompanies an invited talk at the 23rd British Combinatorial Conference (2011).
It appears as a chapter in Surveys in Combinatorics 2011 (Cambridge University Press)
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Figure 1: The left-hand maze (with a single entrance on the left) has 5 solutions
marked with crosses. Note that while solutions need not be accessible starting from
the entrance, at least one will be accessible. The right-hand maze illustrates how
there need not be any solutions when there are 2 entrances. In general, an odd
number of entrances guarantees the existence of a solution.
A naive search for a grid point that corresponds to a dead end or a split of a path is
no longer feasible, so the search problem becomes nontrivial. Notice that not only
must some solution exist, but in addition it is easy to use C to check the validity of
a claimed solution.
The problem of finding, or computing, a Nash equilibrium of a game (defined in
Section 3) is analogous. Nash’s theorem [53] assures us in advance that every game
has a Nash equilibrium, and ultimately it works by applying a similar combinatorial
principle (explained below) to the one that is being used to assure ourselves that
maze problems of the sort defined above must have a solution.
1.1 NP Total Search Problems
Why can we not apply a more standard notion of computational hardness, such
as NP-hardness, to the problem of Nash equilibrium computation? It turns out to
be due precisely to its special status as a total search problem, as informally defined
above.
Standard NP-hard problems do indeed have associated optimisation problems
that are total search problems, but they are not NP total search problems. Consider
for example the (NP-complete) travelling salesman problem, commonly denoted
TSP. This has an associated optimisation problem, in which we seek a tour of
minimal length that visits all the cities. By definition, such a minimal-length tour
must exist, so this total search problem is NP-hard. But it is not, as far as we know,
a member of NP — given a solution there is no obvious efficient way to check its
optimality.
The complexity class PPAD (along with related classes introduced by Papadim-
itriou [57]) was intended to capture the computational complexity of a relatively
small number of problems that seem not to have polynomial-time algorithms, but
where there is a mathematical guarantee that every instance has a solution, and
furthermore, given a solution, the validity of that solution may be checked in polyno-
mial time. Each class of problems (see Section 1.3) has an associated combinatorial
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principle that guarantees that one has a total search problem.
A simple result due to Megiddo [51] shows that if such a problem is NP-complete,
then NP would have to be equal to co-NP— it is proved as follows.
Suppose we have a reduction from any NP-hard problem (e.g. sat) to any NP
total search problem (e.g. Nash). Thus, from any sat-instance (a propositional
formula) we can efficiently construct a Nash-instance (a game) so that given any
solution (Nash equilibrium) to that Nash-instance we can (efficiently) derive an
answer to the sat-instance. That reduction could then be used to construct a
nondeterministic algorithm for verifying that an unsatisfiable instance of sat indeed
has no solution: Just guess a solution of the Nash-instance, and check that it indeed
fails to identify a solution for the sat-instance.
The existence of such a nondeterministic algorithm for sat (one that can verify
that an unsatisfiable formula is indeed unsatisfiable, hence implying that NP=co-
NP) is an eventuality that is considered by complexity theorists almost as unlikely
as P=NP. We conclude that Nash is very unlikely to be NP-complete.
1.2 Reducibility among total search problems
Suppose we have two total search problems X and Y . We say that X is reducible
to Y in polynomial time if the following holds. There should be functions f and g
both computable in polynomial time, such that given an instance IX of X, f(IX) is
an instance of Y , and given any solution S to f(IX), g(S) is a solution to IX . Thus,
if we had a polynomial-time algorithm that solves Y , the reduction would construct
a polynomial-time algorithm for X. So, such a reduction shows that Y is “at least
as hard” as X.
While reductions in the literature are of the above form, one could use a less
restrictive definition, called a Turing reduction, in which problem X reduces to
problem Y provided that we we can write down an algorithm that solves X in
polynomial time, provided that it has access to an “oracle” for problem Y . As a
consequence, if Y does in fact have a polynomial-time algorithm then so does X.
However, the reductions used in the literature to date about total search problems,
are of the more restricted type.
1.3 PPAD, and some related concepts
PPAD, introduced in [57], stands for “polynomial parity argument on a directed
graph”. It is defined in terms of a rather artificial-looking problem End of the
line, which is the following:2
Definition 1.2 An instance of End of the line consists of two boolean circuits
S and P each of which has n inputs and n outputs, such that P (0n) = 0n 6= S(0n).
Find a bit vector x such that P (S(x)) 6= x or S(P (x)) 6= x 6= 0n. 3
2This is called End-of-Line in [13], which is arguably a better name since the “line” is not
unique, and there is no requirement that we find the end of any specific line.
3Chen et al. [13] define it in terms of a single circuit that essentially combines S and P , that
takes an n-bit vector v as input, and outputs 2n bits that correspond to S(v) and P (v).
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S and P (standing for successor and predecessor) implicitly define a digraph G on
2n vertices (bit strings of length n) in which each vertex has indegree and outdegree
at most 1. (v, w) is an arc of G (directed from v to w) if and only if S(v) = w
and P (w) = v. By construction, 0n has indegree 0, and either has outdegree 1,
or P (S(0n)) 6= 0n (in which case 0n is a solution). Notice that G permits efficient
local exploration (the neighbours of any vertex v are easy to compute from v) but
non-local properties are opaque. We shall refer to a graph G that is represented in
this way as an (S, P )-graph.
The “parity argument on a directed graph” refers to a more general observation:
define an “odd” vertex of a graph to be one where the total number of incident
edges is an odd number. Then notice that the number of odd vertices must be an
even number. Indeed, this observation applies generally to undirected graphs, but
we apply it here to (S, P )-graphs, in particular those (S, P )-graphs where vertex
0n actually has an outgoing arc (so has odd degree). These (S, P )-graphs have an
associated total search problem, of finding an alternative odd-degree vertex. One
could search for such a vertex by, for example
• checking each bit string in order, looking up its neighbours to see if it’s an odd
vertex, or
• following a directed path starting at some vertex; an endpoint other than 0n
must be reached,
but since G is exponentially large, these naive approaches will take exponential time
in the worst case.
Definition 1.3 A computational problem X belong to the complexity class PPAD
provided that X reduces to End of the line in polynomial time. Problem X is
PPAD-complete provided that X is in PPAD, and in addition End of the line
reduces to X in polynomial time.
Thus End of the line stands in the same relationship to PPAD, that Circuit
sat does to NP (although NP is not actually defined in terms of Circuit sat,
an equivalent definition would say that NP-complete problems are those that are
polynomial-time equivalent to Circuit sat, and a member of NP is a problem that
can be reduced to Circuit sat).
The above definition of PPAD is the one used in [22]; it is noted there that there
are many alternative equivalent definitions4. Since End of the line is by construc-
tion a total search problem, it follows that members of PPAD are necessarily also
total search problems.
How hard is “PPAD-complete”? PPAD lies “between P and NP” in the
sense that if P were equal to NP, then all PPAD problems would be polynomial-
time solvable, while the assumption that “PPAD-complete problems are hard”
implies P not equal to NP. It is a fair criticism of these results that they do not
carry as much weight as do NP-hardness results, partly for this reason, and partly
4The original definition of [57] is in terms of a Turing machine rather than circuits.
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because there are only a handful of PPAD-complete problems, while thousands of
problems have been shown to be NP-complete.
Why, then, do we take PPAD-completeness as evidence that a problem cannot
be solved in polynomial time? One argument is that End of the line is defined
in terms of unrestricted circuits, and general boolean circuits seem to be hard to
analyse via polynomial-time algorithms. We should also note the oracle separation
results of [4] in this context.
Related complexity classes Other combinatorial principles are considered in [57],
that guarantee totality of corresponding search problems. For example, consider the
pigeonhole principle, that given a function f : X −→ Y , if X and Y are finite
and |X| > |Y |, there must exist x, x′ ∈ X such that f(x) = f(x′). Now define an
associated computational problem:
Definition 1.4 The problemPigeonhole circuit has as instances, directed boolean
circuits having the same number of inputs and outputs. Let f be the function com-
puted by the circuit. The problem is to identify either two distinct bit strings x,
x′ with f(x) = f(x′), or a bit string x with f(x) = 0 (where 0 is the all-zeroes bit
string).
Note that by construction, this a total search problem, and it is an NP total search
problem since it is computationally easy to check that a given solution is valid. At
the same time, it seems to be hard to find a solution, although it is unlikely to be
NP-hard, due to Megiddo’s result. The complexity class PPP [57] (for “polynomial
pigeonhole principle”) is defined as the set of all total search problems that are
reducible to Pigeonhole circuit.
The pigeonhole principle is a generalisation of the parity argument on a directed
graph. To see this, notice that the function f : X −→ Y can map a vertex v of
an End of the line graph to the adjacent vertex connected by an arc from v, or
to itself if v has outdegree 0. PPAD is a subclass of PPP— End of the line
reduces to Pigeonhole circuit; it would be nice to obtain a reduction the other
way and show equivalence, but that has not been achieved.
If we have an undirected graph of degree at most 2 with a known endpoint, then
the search for another endpoint is also a total search problem. The corresponding
complexity class defined in [57] is PPA. The Circuit maze problem that we con-
sidered informally at the start, belongs to PPA. As it happens, the problem is likely
to be complete for PPA.
2 Sperner’s lemma, and an associated computational problem
Sperner’s lemma is the following combinatorial result, that can be used to prove
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
Theorem 2.1 [64] Let {v0, v1, . . . , vd} be the vertices of a d-simplex S, and suppose
that the interior of S is decomposed into smaller simplices using additional vertices.
Assign each vertex a colour from {0, 1, . . . d} such that vi gets colour i, and a vertex
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on any face of S must get one of the colours of the vertices of that face. Interior ver-
tices may be coloured arbitrarily. Then, this simplicial decomposition must include
a panchromatic simplex, i.e. one whose vertices has all distinct colours.
Proof The proof can be found in many places, so here we just give a sketch for
the 2-dimensional case. Let us define the computational problem Sperner (dis-
cussed in more detail below) to be the problem of exhibiting a trichromatic triangle.
Essentially, the proof consists of a reduction from Sperner to End of the line!
Choose any two of the colours, say 0 and 1. We begin by adding some further
triangles to the triangulation as shown in Figure 2 by the dotted lines: by adding
a sequence of triangles that have the original extremal vertex coloured 1, together
with two consecutive vertices on the 1-0 edge, we end up with a triangulation that
has only one 0/1-coloured edge on the exterior.
Construct a directed graph G whose vertices are triangles of this extended trian-
gulation. Add a directed edge of G between any two triangles that are adjacent and
separated by a 0/1-edge; the direction of the edge is so as to cross with 0 on its left
and 1 on its right. Consequently, there is a single edge coming into the triangulation
from the outside. It is simple to check that in G, trichromatic triangles correspond
exactly with degree-1 vertices, solutions to End of the line. This completes the
reduction. 
To define a challenging computational problem involved with searching for a panchro-
matic Sperner simplex, we need to work with Sperner triangulations that are repre-
sented so compactly that it becomes infeasible to just check every simplex. Hence,
we consider exponentially-large simplicial decompositions that satisfy the boundary
conditions required for Sperner’s lemma.
Informally, the computational problem Sperner [57] (with parameter n) takes as
input a Sperner triangulation that contains an number of vertices that is exponential
in n. The vertices —and their colours— cannot be explicitly listed, since problem
instances are supposed to be written down with a syntactic description length that is
polynomial in n. Instead, an instance is specified by a circuit C that takes as input
the coordinates of a vertex and outputs its colour. This means that the vertices
should lie on a regular grid, and C takes as input a bit string that represents the
coordinates of a vertex.
Figure 3 shows one way to do this in 2 dimensions (assume that the central grid
has exponentially-many points). There is no restriction on how C may colour the
vertices labelled ∗; the other labels are fixed boundary conditions to ensure that any
trichromatic triangle lies within the grid. A 3-dimensional version would just require
some choice of simplicial decomposition of a cube, which would then be applied to
each small cube in the corresponding 3-d grid.
2-dimensional Sperner is known to be PPAD-complete [10]; previously it was
known from [57] that 3-dimensional Sperner is PPAD-complete. One interesting
feature of the PPAD-completeness results for Nash equilibrium computation, is
that normal-form games do not incorporate generic boolean circuits in an obvious
way. Contrast that with Sperner as defined above, where a problem instance
incorporates a generic boolean circuit to determine the colour of a vertex. We
continue by explaining Nash equilibrium computation in more detail, and how it is
polynomial-time equivalent to Sperner.
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Figure 2: An example to illustrate Sperner’s lemma.
The solid lines show the triangle and the simplicisation (triangulation, since we are in
2 dimensions.) The dashed lines add an additional sequence of topological triangles
along one side of the triangulation; as a result of those lines, there is only one edge
coloured 0-1 when viewed from the exterior.
The arrows are the directed edges of the corresponding graph.
The shaded triangles are trichromatic (End-of-line solutions in the corresponding
graph).
1
2
0
1 1 1 1 1
2
* * *
0
2
* * *
0
2
* * *
0
2 0 0 0 0
Figure 3: Embedding a triangulated grid inside an instance of Sperner’s lemma
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3 Games and Nash Equilibria
A game G specifies a finite set of k ≥ 2 players, where each player i has a finite
set Si of (at least two) actions or pure strategies. Let S = S1× . . .×Sk be the set of
pure strategy profiles, thus an element of S represents a choice made by each player
i of a single pure strategy from his set Si. Finally, given any member of S, G needs
to specify real-valued utilities or payoffs to each player that result from that pure
strategy profile. Let uis denote the payoff to player i that results from s ∈ S.
Informally, a Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies —one for each player— where
no player has an “incentive to deviate” i.e. play some alternative strategy. After
giving some examples, we provide a precise definition, along with some notation. In
general, Nash equilibria do not exist for pure strategies; it is usually necessary to
allow the players to randomise over them, as shown in the following examples.
Rock-paper-scissors:
rock paper scissors
rock (0, 0) (−1, 1) (1,−1)
paper (1,−1) (0, 0) (−1, 1)
scissors (−1, 1) (1,−1) (0, 0)
A typical payoff matrix for Stag hunt:
hunt stag hunt hare
hunt stag (8, 8) (0, 1)
hunt hare (1, 0) (1, 1)
Generalised matching pennies: the row player “wins” (and collects a payment
from the column player) whenever both players play the same strategy.
1 2 · · · n
1 (1,−1) (0, 0) · · · (0, 0)
2 (0, 0) (1,−1) (0, 0)
...
...
. . . (0, 0)
n (0, 0) · · · (0, 0) (1,−1)
Figure 4: Payoff matrices for example games. Each entry of a matrix contains two
numbers: the row player’s payoff and the column player’s payoff.
Example 3.1 The traditional game of rock-paper-scissors fits in to the basic paradigm
considered here. The standard payoff matrix shown in Figure 4 awards one point
for winning and a penalty of one point for losing. The unique Nash equilibrium has
both players randomising uniformly over their strategies, for an expected payoff of
zero.
Example 3.2 The stag hunt game [60] has two players, each of whom has two
actions, corresponding to hunting either a stag, or a hare. In order to catch a stag,
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both player must cooperate (choose to hunt a stag), but either player can catch a
hare on his own. The benefit of hunting a stag is that the payoff (half share of a
stag) is presumed to be substantially larger than an entire hare.
A typical choice of payoffs (Figure 4) to reflect this dilemma could award 8 to
both players when they both hunt a stag, 0 to a player who hunts a stag while the
other player hunts a hare, and 1 to a player who hunts a hare. Using these payoffs,
there are 3 Nash equilibria: one where both players hunt a stag, one where both
players hunt a hare, and one where each player hunts a stag with probability 18 and
a hare with probability 78 .
Example 3.3 Generalised matching pennies (Figure 4) is a useful example to present
here, since it is used as an ingredient of the PPAD-completeness proof for Nash.
The game of matching pennies is a 2-player game, whose basic version has each
player having just two strategies, “heads” and “tails”. The row player wins whenever
both players make the same choice, otherwise the column player wins. In the original
version, a win effectively means that the losing player pays one unit to the winning
player; here we modify payoffs so that a win for the column player just results in
zero payoffs (he avoids paying the row player). With that modification, generalised
matching pennies is the extension to n actions rather than just 2.
There is a unique Nash equilibrium in which both players use the uniform dis-
tribution over their pure strategies, and it is easy to see that no other solution is
possible.
Comments. The Stag Hunt example shows that there may be multiple equilibria,
that some equilibria have more social welfare than others, and that some are more
“plausible” that others (thus, it seems reasonable to expect one of the two pure-
strategy equilibria to be played, rather than the randomised one). The topic of
equilibrium selection considers formalisations of the notion of plausibility, and the
problem of computing the relevant equilibria. Of course, it is at least as hard to
compute one of a subset of equilibria as it is to compute an unrestricted one. For
example, it is NP-complete to compute equilibria that guarantee one or both players
a certain level of payoff, or that satisfy various other properties that are efficiently
checkable [18, 35].
If we know the supports of a Nash equilibrium (the strategies played with non-
zero probability) then it would be straightforward to compute a Nash equilibrium,
since it then reduces to a linear programming problem. Thus (as noted by Papadim-
itriou in [55]) the search for a Nash equilibrium is —in the 2-player case— essentially
a combinatorial problem.
Nash equilibrium and -Nash equilibrium; definition and notation. A
mixed strategy for player i is a distribution on Si, that is, |Si| nonnegative real
numbers summing to 1. We will use xij to denote the probability that player i
allocates to strategy j ∈ Si. If some or all players use mixed strategies, this results
in expected payoffs for the players. A best response by a player is a strategy (possibly
mixed) that maximises that player’s expected payoff; the assumption is that players
do indeed play to maximise expected payoffs.
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Call a set of k mixed strategies xij a Nash equilibrium if, for each player i, i’s
expected payoff
∑
s∈S u
i
s
∏k
r=1 x
r
sr is maximized over all mixed strategies of i. That
is, a Nash equilibrium is a set of mixed strategies from which no player has an
incentive to deviate. Let S−i = S1 × . . . × Si−1 × Si+1 × . . . × Sk, the set of pure
strategy profiles of players other than i. For s ∈ S−i, let xs =
∏
r 6=i;r∈[k] x
r
sr and u
i
js
be the payoff to i when i plays j and the other players play s. It is well-known (see,
e.g., [56]) that the following is an equivalent condition for a set of mixed strategies
to be a Nash equilibrium:
∀i, j, j′
∑
s∈S−i
uijsxs >
∑
s∈S−i
uij′sxs =⇒ xij′ = 0. (3.1)
Also, a set of mixed strategies is an -Nash equilibrium for some  > 0 if the
following holds:
∀i, j, j′
∑
s∈S−i
uijsxs >
∑
s∈S−i
uij′sxs +  =⇒ xij′ = 0. (3.2)
The celebrated theorem of Nash [53] states that every game has a Nash equilibrium.
Comments. An -Nash equilibrium is a weaker notion than a Nash equilibrium;
a Nash equilibrium is an -Nash equilibrium for  = 0, and generally an -Nash
equilibrium is an ′-Nash equilibrium for any ′ > .
Why focus on approximate equilibria? Approximate equilibria matter from
the computational perspective, because for games of more than 2 players, a solution
(Nash equilibrium) may be in irrational numbers, even when the utilities uis that
specify a game, are themselves rational numbers [53]. The problem of computing
a Nash equilibrium —as opposed to just knowing that one exists— requires us to
specify a format or syntax in which to output the quantities that make up a solution
(i.e. the probabilities xis).
In [23] (an expository paper on the results of [22]) we noted an analogy between
equilibrium computation and the computation of a root of an odd-degree polynomial
f in a single variable. For both problems, there is a guarantee that a solution really
exists, and the guarantee is based on the nature of the problem rather than a promise
that the given instance has a solution. Furthermore, in each problem we have to deal
with the issue of how to represent a solution, since a solution need not necessarily
be a rational number. And, in both cases a natural approach is to switch to some
notion of approximate solution: instead of searching for x with f(x) = 0, search for
x with |f(x)| < , which ensures that x can be written down in a standard syntax.
3.1 Some reductions among equilibrium problems
By way of example, consider the well-known result (that predates the PPAD-
hardness of Nash; see [55] Chapter 2 for further background) that symmetric 2-
player games are as hard to solve as general ones.
Given a n×n game G, construct a symmetric 2n×2n game G′ = f(G), such that
given any Nash equilibrium of G′ we can efficiently reconstruct a Nash equilibrium
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of G. To begin, let us assume that all payoffs in G are positive — the reason why
this assumption is fine, is that if there are any negative payoffs, then we can add a
sufficiently large constant to all payoffs and obtain a strategically equivalent version
(i.e. one that has the same Nash equilibria).
Now suppose we solve the 2n × 2n game G′ =
(
0 G
GT 0
)
, where we assume
that entries contain payoffs to both players, and the zeroes represent n×n matrices
of payoffs of zero to both players.
Let p and q denote the probabilities that players 1 and 2 use their first n actions,
in some given solution. If we label the rows and columns of the payoff matrix with
the probabilities assigned to them by the players, we have
q 1− q
p
1− p
(
0 G
GT 0
)
If p = q = 1, both players receive payoff 0, and both have an incentive to change
their behaviour, by the assumption that G’s payoffs are all positive (and similarly if
p = q = 0). So we have p > 0 and 1− q > 0, or alternatively, 1− p > 0 and q > 0.
Assume p > 0 and 1 − q > 0 (the analysis for the other case is similar). Let
{p1, ..., pn} be the probabilities used by player 1 for his first n actions, {q1, . . . qn}
the probabilities for player 2’s second n actions.
q (q1...qn)
(p1, ...pn)
1− p
(
0 G
GT 0
)
Note that p1 + . . .+ pn = p and q1 + . . .+ qn = 1− q. Then (p1/p, . . . , pn/p)
and (q1/(1− q), . . . , qn/(1− q)) are a Nash equilibrium of G. To see this, consider
the diagram; they should form a best response to each other for the top-right part.
This is an example of the kind of reduction defined in Section 1.2. In the context
of games, this kind of reduction is called in [1] a Nash homomorphism. Abbott et
al. [1] reduce general 2-player games to win-lose 2-player games (where payoffs are 0
or 1). Various other Nash homomorphisms have been derived independently of the
work relating Nash to PPAD. An important one is Bubelis [8] that reduces (in a
more algebraic style) k-player games to 3-player games. The result also highlights a
key distinction between k-player games (for k ≥ 3) and 2-player games; in 2-player
games the solutions are rational numbers (provided that the payoff in the games are
rational) while for 3 or more players, the solutions may be irrational. The reduction
of [8] preserves key algebraic properties of the quantities xij in a solution, such as
their degree (i.e the degree of the lowest-degree polynomial with integer coefficients
satisfied by xij). Since we have noted that 2-player games have solutions in rational
numbers, this kind of reduction could not apply to 2-player games.
3.2 The “in PPAD” result
A proof that Nash equilibrium computation belongs to PPAD necessarily in-
corporates a proof of Nash’s theorem itself (for approximate equilibrium), in that a
reduction from -Nash to End of the line assures us that -Nash is a total search
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problem, since it is clear that End of the line is. To derive Nash’s theorem itself,
that an exact equilibrium exists, the summary as in [57] is as follows: Consider an
infinite sequence of solutions to -Nash for smaller and smaller . Since the space
of mixed-strategy profiles is compact, these solutions have a limit point, which must
be an exact solution.
3.3 The Algebraic Properties of Nash Equilibria
A reader who is interested on the combinatorial aspects of the topic can skip most
of this subsection; the main point to note is that since a Nash equilibrium is not
necessarily in rational numbers, this motivates the focus on approximate equilibria
(i.e. -Nash equilibria), to ensure that there is a natural syntax in which to output
a computed solution to a game. Since any exact equilibrium is an approximate
one, any hardness result for approximate equilibria applies automatically to exact
ones. The question of polynomial-time computation of approximate equilibria was
introduced in [37] in order to finesse the irrationality of exact solutions. However,
algorithms for approximate equilibria go back earlier, notably Scarf’s algorithm [62].
For positive , an -Nash equilibrium need not be at all close to a true Nash
equilibrium. Etessami and Yannakakis [31] show that even for exponentially small ,
an -Nash equilibrium may be at variation distance 1 from any true Nash equilibrium,
for a 3-player game. Furthermore, they also show that computing an approximate
equilibrium that is within variation distance  from a true one (an -near equilibrium)
is square-root-sum hard. This refers to the following well-known computational
problem:
Definition 3.4 The square root sum problem takes as input two sets of positive
integers, say {x1, . . . , xn} and {y1, . . . , yn}. The question is: is the sum of the
square roots of the first set, greater than the sum of square roots of the second?
The problem is not known to belong to NP, although neither is it known to be hard
for any well-known complexity class. In terms of upper-bounding the complexity of
this problem, and also for that matter, computing an -near equilibrium, we may
note that the criteria for a set of numbers xij to be an -near equilibrium can be
expressed in the existential theory of real arithmetic, which places the problem in
PSPACE [58].
The fact that Nash equilibrium probabilities can be irrational numbers (while
payoffs are rational numbers) appears in an example in Nash’s paper [53]. He de-
scribes a simple poker-style game with 3 players and a unique (irrational) Nash
equilibrium. We noted earlier that any game with rational payoffs has Nash equi-
libria probabilities that are algebraic numbers. But even for a 3-player game, if
n is the number of actions, the solution may require algebraic numbers of degree
exponentially large in n; as noted in [37], the constructions introduced there give us
a flexible way to construct, from a given polynomial p, an arithmetic circuit whose
fixpoints are the roots of p, and [37] shows how to construct a 4-player game whose
equilibria encode those fixpoints. The paper of Bubelis [8] gave an “algebraic” re-
duction from any k-player game (for k > 3) to a corresponding 3-player game, in a
way that preserves the algebraic properties of the solutions. Consequently 3-player
games have the same feature of 4-player games identified in [37]. The reduction
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of [8] can in addition be used to show that 3-player games are as computationally
hard to solve as k-players, but it does not highlight the expressive power of games
as arithmetic circuits. Recently, Feige and Talgam-Cohen [32] give a reduction from
(approximate) k-player Nash to 2-player Nash, that does not explicitly proceed via
End of the line.
Is Nash equilibrium computation ever harder than PPAD? Daskalakis
et al. [20] show that most standard classes of concisely-represented games (such
as graphical games and polymatrix games) have equilibrium computation problems
that reduce to 2-Nash and so belong to PPAD. Schoenebeck and Vadhan [63] study
the question for “circuit games”, a very general concise representation of games
where payoffs are given by a boolean circuit. In this context they obtain hardness
results, but this is not an NP total search problem. The zero-sum version [33] is
also hard.
4 Brouwer functions, and discrete Brouwer functions
Brouwer’s fixpoint theorem states that every continuous function from a convex
compact domain to itself, must have a fixpoint, a point x for which f(x) = x.
Proving Brouwer’s fixpoint theorem using Sperner’s lemma Suppose to
begin with that the domain in question is the d-simplex ∆d. We have continuous
f : ∆d −→ ∆d and we seek a point x ∈ ∆d with f(x) = x. Suppose f is evaluated
on a set S of “sample points” in ∆d, and at each point x ∈ S, consider the value
of f(x) − x. If the d + 1 vertices of ∆d are given distinct colours {0, 1, . . . , d}, we
colour-code any x ∈ S according to the direction of f(x)−x: we give it the colour of
a vertex which is at least as distant from f(x) as from x. Such a colouring respects
the constraints of Sperner’s lemma. If S is used as the vertices of a simplicial
decomposition, a panchromatic simplex becomes a plausible location for a fixpoint
(f is displacing co-located vertices in all different directions). One obtains a fixpoint
from the limit of increasingly fine simplicial decompositions.
The result can then be extended to other domains that are topologically equiv-
alent to simplices, such as cubes/cuboids, as used in the constructions we describe
here.
In defining an associated computational total search problem “find the point x”,
we need to identify a syntax or format in which to represent a class of continuous
functions. The format should ensure that f can be computed in time polynomial
in f ’s description length (so that solutions x are easily checkable, and the search
problem is in NP). The class of functions that we define are based on discrete
Brouwer functions, defined in detail below in Section 4.1.
Discrete Brouwer functions form the bridge between the discrete circuit problem
End of the line and the continuous, numerical problem of computing a Nash
equilibrium.
Consider the following obvious fact5 that if we colour the integers {0, . . . , n} such
that
5pointed out in [13] (Section 5.1)
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• each integer is coloured either red or black, and
• 0 is coloured red, and n is coloured black
then there must be two consecutive numbers that have different colours.
Now suppose that n is exponentially large, but for any number x in the range
{0, . . . , n} we have an efficient test to identify the colour of x. In that case, we still
have an efficient search for consecutive numbers that have opposite colours, namely
we can use binary search. If bn/2c is coloured black, we would search for the pair
of numbers in the range {0, . . . , bn/2c}, otherwise we would search in the range
{bn/2c, . . . , n}, and so on.
Now consider a 2-dimensional version with pairs of numbers (x, y), x, y ∈ {0, . . . , n},
where pairs of numbers are coloured as follows.
• if x = 0, (x, y) is coloured red,
• if y = 0 and x > 0 then (x, y) is coloured yellow,
• if x, y > 0 and either x = n or y = n (or both), then (x, y) is coloured black.
Thus, we have fixed the colouring of the perimeter of the grid of points, but we
impose no constraints on how the interior should be coloured. We claim that there
exists a square of size 1 that has all 3 colours, but notice that binary search no
longer finds such a square efficiently6. The fact that such a square exists is due to
Sperner’s lemma, whose proof envisages following a path that enters the n×n grid,
ending up at a trichromatic square; intuitively, this can be achieved by entering at
the point on the perimeter where red and yellow are adjacent, and walking around
the outside of the red region. Since there is only one exterior red/yellow interval,
we are guaranteed to reach a stage where the red region is no longer bounded by
yellow points, but by black points.
4.1 Discrete Brouwer functions
We next give a detailed definition of discrete Brouwer functions (DBFs), together
with an associated total search problem (on an exponential-sized domain), that is
used in the reductions from End of the line to the search for a Nash equilibrium
of a game. Figure 5 shows how an End of the line graph is encoded by a DBF.
Definition 4.1 Partition the unit d-dimensional cube K into “cubelets”— 2dn axis
aligned cubes of edge length 2−n. A Brouwer-mapping circuit (in d dimensions)
takes as input a bit string of length dn that represents the coordinates of a cubelet,
and outputs its colour, subject to boundary constraints that generalise the 2-D case
discussed above. A Discrete Brouwer function (DBF) is the function computed by
such a circuit, and its syntactic complexity is the size of the circuit that represents
it, which we restrict to be polynomial in n.
6Hirsch et al. [45] give lower bounds for algorithms that search for fixed points based on function
evaluation. In this setting, an algorithm that searches for a fixed point of f has “black-box access”
to f ; f may be computed on query points but the internal structure of f is hidden. They contrast
the one-dimension case with the 2-dimensional case by showing that in 2 dimensions, the search for
an approximate fixed point of a Lipschitz continuous function in 2D, accurate to p binary digits,
requires Ω(cp) for some constant c, in contrast to 1D where bisection may be used.
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Figure 5: The figure shows how the line graph (v0, v1), (v1, v3), (v3, v2) is encoded as
a discrete Brouwer function in two dimensions.
The function colours the grid as a long thin red/yellow strip on a black background.
Each vertex vi is associated with a horizontal line segment close to the x-axis (circled
in the diagram). Each edge (vi, vj) is associated with a “bridge” from the right-hand
side of vi’s line segment to the left-hand side of vj ’s.
Each bridge consists of three red/yellow line segments, going up, across and down.
The y-coordinate of the horizontal segment y(i, j) should efficiently encode the values
i and j (for example, y(i, j) = i+N.j where N is the number of x-values possible).
Hence no two bridges can have overlapping horizontal sections. Unfortunately, a
horizontal section may need to cross a vertical section of a different bridge, as shown
in the diagram. Here a crossover gadget of [10] (Figure 6) may be used.
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Black
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Figure 6: The crossover gadget referred to in Figure 5.
To avoid all three colours meeting in the vicinity of the crossing of two red/yellow
path segments: the simple solution is to re-connect the paths in a way that the
topological structure of the red-yellow line no longer mimics the structure of the
End of the line graph from which it was derived. The 3-dimensional version,
invented in [57] and refined in [22] does not require crossover gadgets.
This gives rise to the total search problem of finding a vertex that belongs to
cubelets of all the different colours (a “panchromatic cubelet”). A superficial dif-
ference between the presentation of this concept in [22] compared with [13] is that
[22] associates each cubelet with a colour while [13] associated each vertex with a
colour, and the search is for a cubelet that has vertices of all colours.
5 From Discrete Brouwer functions to Games
The reduction is broken down into two stages: first we take a circuit C repre-
senting a DBF and encode it as an arithmetic circuit C ′ that computes a continuous
function from Kd to Kd, where Kd is the d-dimensional unit cube. Then we express
C ′ as a game G in such a way that given any Nash equilibrium of G, we can efficiently
extract the coordinates of a fixpoint of C ′.
Figure 7 gives the general idea of how to construct a continuous function f
from a DBF, in such a way that fixpoints of the continuous function correspond
to solutions of the DBF. The idea is that each colour in the range of the DBF
corresponds to a direction of f(x)−x. For a colour that lies on the boundary of the
discretised cube, we choose a direction away from that boundary, so that f avoids
displacing points outside the cube. Indeed, this is where we require the boundary
constraints on the colouring of DBFs. Points at the centres of the cubelets of the
DBF will be displaced in the direction of that cubelet’s colour, while points on or
near the boundary of two or more cubelets should get directions that interpolate the
individual colour-directions (which is necessary for continuity). A natural choice for
these colour-directions results in the following property: For a proper subset of these
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Figure 7: The top left-hand diagram shows a simple discrete Brouwer function in 2
dimensions, and the arrows in the bottom left-hand diagram show the direction of
the corresponding continuous Brouwer function f within each small square.
The right-hand diagram is a magnified view of the bottom right-hand section of
the continuous Brouwer function, showing how the direction of the function (i.e the
direction of f(x)− x) can be interpolated on the boundaries of the small squares.
It is always possible to smoothly interpolate between 2 different directions without
introducing fixed points of f . But, in the vicinity of the point where all 3 colours
meet, there will necessarily be a point x where f(x) = x.
directions, their average cannot be zero. On the other hand, a weighted average of
all the directions can indeed be zero.
Arithmetic circuits The papers [13, 22] show how to construct arithmetic cir-
cuits that compute these kinds of continuous functions. An arithmetic circuit con-
sists of a directed graph each of whose nodes belongs to one of a number of distinct
types, such as addition and multiplication. Each node will compute a real num-
ber, and the type of a node dictates how that number is obtained. For example,
an addition node should have 2 incoming arcs, and it will compute the sum of the
values located at the adjacent nodes for those two arcs; it may also have a number
of outgoing arcs that allow its value to feed in to other nodes.
A significant difference between the circuits of [22] and those of [13] is that
the latter do not allow nodes that compute the product of two computed quantities
(located at other nodes with incoming edges). They do allow the multiplication of
a computed quantity by a constant. The result of this is
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• The functions that can be computed are more constrained; however they are
still expressive enough to simulate the behaviour of DBF circuits,
• two-player normal-form games can simulate the circuits of [13], while three-
player games are required to simulate circuits that can multiply a pair of
computed quantities.
The more general circuits introduced in [22] correspond to the algebraic complexity
class FIXP of Etessami and Yannakakis [31]; the ones without these product nodes
correspond to PPAD, the linear version of FIXP, called LINEAR-FIXP in [31].
Interpolating the directions For a point x that is not on a cubelet boundary,
one can design a polynomial-sized arithmetic circuit that compares the values of
its coordinates against various numbers, eventually determining which cubelet it
belongs to. Its colour assigned by the original DBF can be computed using a further
component of the arithmetic circuit, that simulates the DBF. A further component
of the circuit can translate the colour to a direction-vector, which gets added to x
to yield f(x).
For x on or close to a cubelet boundary, both papers [13, 22] perform the inter-
polation as follows. f is computed not just at x, but also at a small cluster of points
in the vicinity of x. Then the average value of f(x′) is computed, for all points x′
in this cluster. [13] show how this can be done in non-constant dimension, which
allows a stronger hardness-of-approximation result to be obtained; see below. For
constant dimension this clustering trick can be avoided; [38] shows the interpolation
can be done more directly, and without the multiplication nodes discussed above.
Encoding approximate solutions, and snake embeddings Snake embed-
dings, invented by Chen et al. [13] allow hardness results for -approximate solutions
where  is inverse polynomial in n. A snake embedding maps a discrete Brouwer
function F to a lower-dimension DBF F ′, in such a way that a solution to F ′ effi-
ciently encodes a solution to F , and the number of cubelets along the edges decreases
by a constant factor. Applying these repeatedly, we obtain a DBF in Θ(n) dimen-
sions where the cubelets have O(1) edge length. The coordinates of points in the
cube can be perturbed by relatively large amounts without leaving a cubelet.
5.1 Graphical Games
Graphical games were introduced in [47, 50] as a succinct means of representing
certain games having many players. In a graphical game, each player has an associ-
ated vertex of an underlying graph G. The payoff to a player at vertex v is assumed
to depend only on the behaviour of himself and his neighbours. Consequently, for a
low-degree graph, the payoffs can be described much more concisely than would be
allowed by normal form.
Graphical games were used by Daskalakis et al. [22] as an intermediate stage
between discrete Brouwer functions, and normal-form games. That is, it was shown
in [22] how a discrete Brouwer function can be converted into a graphical game GG
such that any Nash equilibrium of GG encodes a solution to the discrete Brouwer
function. Essentially, the underlying graph of GG has the same structure as the
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arithmitic circuit derived from the DBF, and the probabilities in the Nash equilib-
rium correspond to the quantities computed in the circuit. Chen et al [13] reduce
more directly from discrete Brouwer functions to 2-player games.
5.2 From graphical to normal-form games
Recall the game of generalised matching pennies (GMP) from Example 3.3. The
construction used in [13, 22] starts with a “prototype” zero-sum game consisting of a
version of GMP where all strategies have been duplicated, as shown in the following
payoff matrix R for the row player (M is some large positive quantity).
R =

M M 0 0 · · · 0 0
M M 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 M M · · · 0 0
0 0 M M · · · 0 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 0 · · · M M
0 0 0 0 · · · M M

Having noted that GMP has a unique equilibrium in which both players randomise
uniformly, we next note that in the above game, each player will randomise uniformly
over pairs of duplicated strategies. So, each player allocates probability 1n to each
such pair. Within each pair, that allocation of 1n may be split arbitrarily; G imposes
no constraints on how to divide it.
The idea next, is to add certain quantities to the payoffs (that are relatively
small in comparison with M) so that a player’s choice of how to split between a
pair of “duplicated” strategies may affect the opponents’ choice for other pairs of
his strategies. It can be shown that in Nash equilibria of the resulting game,
• the probability allocated to any strategy-pair is not exactly 1n but is fairly
close, since the value of M dominates the other payoffs that are introduced,
• the probabilities p and p′ allocated to the members of a strategy-pair are used
to represent the number p/(p+ p′) ∈ [0, 1],
• the numbers thus represented can be made to affect each others’ values in the
same way that players in a graphical game, having just 2 pure strategies {0, 1},
affect each others’ probabilities of playing 1.
6 Easy and hard classes of games
The PPAD-completeness results for normal-form games have led to a line of re-
search addressing the very natural question of what types of games admit polynomial-
time algorithms, and which ones are also PPAD-hard. In particular, with regard
to PPAD-hardness, the general aim is to obtain hardness results for games that are
more and more syntactically restricted; the first results, for 4 players [21], then 3
players [12, 25], and then 2 players [11] can be seen as the initial chapter in this nar-
rative. In this section, our focus is on results on the frontier of PPAD-completeness
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and membership of P. We do not consider games where solutions can be shown to ex-
ist by means of a potential function argument (known to be equivalent to congestion
games [52, 59]).
While normal-form games are the most natural ones to consider from a theoret-
ical perspective, there are many alternative ways to specify a game. It is, after all,
unnatural to write down a description of a game in normal form; only for very small
games is this feasible.
6.1 Hard equilibrium computation problems
So, one natural direction is to look for PPAD-hardness results for more restricted
types of games than the ones currently known to be PPAD-hard.
Restricted 2-player games We currently know that 2-player games are hard to
solve even when they are sparse [13, 14]; the problem Sparse bimatrix denotes
the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium for 2-player games having a constant
bound on the number of non-zero entries in each row and column. (For example,
Theorem 10.1 of [13] show that 2-player games remain PPAD-hard when rows and
columns have up to 10 non-zero entries.) 2-player games are also PPAD-complete
to solve when they have 0/1 payoffs [1]7.
Restricted graphical games It is shown in [30] that degree-2 graphical games
are solvable in polynomial time, but PPAD-complete for graphs with constant
pathwidth (it is an open question precisely what pathwidth is required to make
the problem PPAD-complete).
Ranking games Brandt et al. [5] study ranking games from a computational-
complexity viewpoint. Ranking games are proposed as model of various real-world
competitions; the outcome of the players’ behaviour is a ranking of its participants,
thus is maps any pure-strategy profile to a ranking of the players. Let uir be the
payoff to player i that results from being ranked r-th, where we assume uir ≥ uir+1
(players prefer to be ranked first to being ranked second, and so on.)
In the 2-player case, any ranking game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum
game. For more than 2 players, one can apply the observation of [54] that any
k-player game is essentially equivalent to a k + 1-player zero-sum game, where the
additional player is given payoffs that set the total payoff to zero, but takes no part
in the game, in that his actions do not affect the other players’ payoffs. Using this,
it is easy to reduce 2-player win-lose games to 3-player ranking games.
Polymatrix games A polymatrix game is a multiplayer game in which any player’s
payoff is the sum of payoffs he obtains from bimatrix games with the other players.
A special case of interest is where there is a limit on the number of pure strategies
per player. In general, these polymatrix games are PPAD-complete [20], which also
follows from [22] — specifically Section 6 of [22] presents a PPAD-hardness proof
7The paper of Abbott et al. [1] appeared before the first PPAD-hardness results for games, and
reduced the search for Nash equilibria of general 2-player games to the search for Nash equilibria
in 0/1-payoff 2-player games (i.e. win-lose games).
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for 2-Nash by using graphical game gadgets that have the feature that the payoff
to a vertex can be expressed as the sum of payoffs of 2-player games with his neigh-
bours. (This extension to 2-Nash applies the observation that it is unnecessary to
have a player who computes the product of his neighbours; such a vertex has payoffs
that cannot decompose as the sum of bimatrix games.)
6.2 Polynomial-time equilibrium computation problems
In reviewing some of the computational positive results (types of games that
have polynomial-time algorithms) we focus on games where the search problem
is guaranteed to be total due to being in PPAD, as opposed to potential games
for example, where equilibria can be shown to exist due to a potential function
argument.
Restricted win-lose games The papers [2, 16] identify polynomial-time algo-
rithms for subclasses of the win-lose games shown to be hard by [1]. A win-lose
game has an associated bipartite graph whose vertices are the pure strategies of the
two players. We add an edge from s to s′ if when the players play s and s′, the player
of s obtains a payoff of 1. Addario-Berry et al. [2] study the special case when this
graph is planar, and obtain an algorithm based on a search in the graph for certain
combinatorial structures within the graph, that runs in polynomial time for planar
graphs. Codenotti et al. [16] study win-lose games in which the number of winning
entries in each row or column is at most 2. Their approach also involves searching
for certain structures within a corresponding digraph.
Approximate equilibria The main question is: for what values of  > 0 can
one compute -Nash equilibria in polynomial time? The question has mainly been
considered in the 2-player case. Note that [13] established that there is not a fully
polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing -Nash equilibria. However,
it is also known that for any constant  > 0, the problem is subexponential [49].
There has not been much progress in the past couple of years on reducing the
value of  that is obtainable; the papers cited in [22] represent the state of the art in
this respect. Perhaps the simplest non-trivial algorithm for computing approximate
Nash equilibria is the following, due to Daskalakis et al. [24]. Figure 8 shows a
generalisation of the algorithm of [24], to k players, obtained independently in [6, 40].
These papers also obtain the lower bounds for solutions having constant support.
The approximation guarantee is 1− 1k ; it is noted in [6] that one can do slightly better
by using a more sophisticated 2-player algorithm at the midpoint of the procedure.
Ranking games A restriction of the ranking games mentioned above, to those
having “competitiveness-based strategies” were recently proposed in [36] as a sub-
class of ranking games that seems to have better computational properties, while
still being able to capture features of many real-world competitions for rank. In
these games, a player’s strategies may be ordered in a sequence that reflects how
“competitive” they are. If we let {a1, . . . , an} be the actions available to a player,
then each aj has two associated quantities, a cost cj and a return rj , where return is
a monotonically increasing function of cost. Given any pure-strategy profile, players
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1. For i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1
(a) Player i allocates probability 1− 1k+1−i to some arbitrary strategy
2. For i = k, k − 1, . . . , 1
(a) Player i allocates his remaining probability to a best response to the
strategy combination played so far.
Figure 8: Approximation algorithm for k-player Nash
are ranked on the returns of their actions and awarded prizes from that ranking.
The payoff to a player is the value of the prize he wins, minus the cost of his action.
This results in a trade-off between saving on cost, versus spending more with the
aim of a larger prize. Notice that, in contrast to unrestricted ranking games [5], this
restriction allows games with many players to be written down concisely.
Anonymous games Anonymous games represent a useful way to concisely de-
scribe certain games having a large number of players — in an anonymous game,
each player has the same set of pure strategies {a1, . . . , ak}, and the payoff to player
i for playing aj depends only on i and the total number of players to play aj (but not
the identities of those players; hence the phrase “anonymous game”). Daskalakis and
Papadimitriou [26] give a polynomial-time approximation scheme for these games,
but note that it is an open problem whether an exact equilibrium may be computed
in polynomial time.
Polymatrix games Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [27] show that polymatrix
games may be solved exactly when the bimatrix games between pairs of players
are zero-sum. This result is applied in [36] to a subclass of the games studied there,
specifically ranking games where prize values are a linearly decreasing function of
rank placement.
7 The Complexity of Path-following Algorithms
In this section we report on recent progress [38] that shows an even closer analogy
between equilibrium computation and the problem End of the line. Namely, that
the solutions found by certain well-known “path-following” algorithms have the same
computational complexity as the search for the solution to End of the line that
is obtained by following the line. Specifically, both are PSPACE-complete.
Consider the algorithm for End of the line that works by simply “following
the line” from the given starting-point 0n until an endpoint is reached. Clearly
this takes exponential time in the worst case, but in fact we can say something
stronger. Let Oeotl denote the problem “other end of this line”, which requires as
output, the endpoint reached by following directed edges from the given starting-
point. Papadimitriou observed in [57] that the following holds:
Theorem 7.1 [57] Oeotl is PSPACE-complete.
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Notice that a solution to Oeotl is apparently no longer in NP, since while we can
check that it solves End of the line, there is no obvious way to efficiently check
that it is the correct end-of-line, i.e. the one connected to the given starting-point.
Proof (sketch) We reduce from the problem of computing the final configuration
of a polynomial space bounded Turing machine (TM).
The proof uses the fact that polynomial-space-bounded Turing machines can be
simulated by polynomial-space-bounded reversible Turing machines [19]. By a con-
figuration of a TM computation we mean a complete description of an intermediate
state of computation, including the contents of the tape, and the state and location
of the TM on the tape. Reversible TMs have the property that given an interme-
diate configuration, one can readily obtain not just the subsequent configuration,
but also the previous one; this is done by memorising a carefully-chosen subset of
previous configurations that the machine uses in the course of a computation [19].
From there, it is straightforward to simulate a reversible Turing machine using
the two circuits S and P of an instance of Oeotl. Each vertex v of an (S, P )-graph
encodes a configuration of a linear-space-bounded TM; S computes the subsequent
configuration, and P computes the previous configuration. 
In the context of searching for Nash equilibria, a number of algorithms have
been proposed that work by following paths is a graph G associated with game G,
where G is derived from G via a reduction to End of the line. Examples include
Scarf’s algorithm [62] (for approximate solutions of k-player games) and the Lemke-
Howson algorithm [48] (an exact algorithm for 2-player games). These algorithms
were proposed as being in practice more computationally efficient than a brute-force
approach. Related algorithms include the linear tracing procedure and homotopy
methods [39, 41, 42, 43, 44] discussed below: in these papers the motivation is
equilibrium selection — in cases where multiple equilibria exist, we seek a criterion
for identifying a “plausible” one.
Homotopy methods for Game Theory In topology, a homotopy refers to a
continuous deformation from some geometrical object to another one. Suppose we
want to solve game G. Let G0 denote another game obtained by changing the nu-
merical utilities of G in such a way that there is some “obvious” equilibrium; for
example, we could change the payoffs so that each player obtains 1 for playing his
first strategy, and 0 for any other strategy, regardless of the behaviour of the other
player(s). Then, we can continuously deform G0 to get back to G. For t ∈ [0, 1] let
Gt be a game whose payoffs are weighted averages of those in G0 with those in G: we
write this as Gt = (1− t)G0+ tG. A homotopy method for solving G involves keeping
track of the equilibria of Gt, which should move continuously as t increases from 0
to 1. There should be a continuous path from the known equilibrium of G0 to some
equilibrium of G (an application of Browder’s fixed point theorem [7].) The catch
is, that in following this path it may be necessary for t to go down as well as up.
The main theorem of [38] is that
Theorem 7.2 [38] It is PSPACE-complete to compute any of the equilibria that
are obtained by the Lemke-Howson algorithm.
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The Lemke-Howson algorithm is usually presented as a discrete path-following
algorithm, in which a 2-player game has an associated degree-2 graph G as
follows. Vertices of G are mixed strategy profiles that are characterised by the
subset of the players’ strategies that are either played with probability zero, or
are best responses to the other player’s mixed strategy. To be a vertex of G, a
mixed-strategy profile should satisfy one of the following:
• All pure strategies are labelled, or
• All but one pure strategies are labelled, and one pure strategy is labelled
twice, due to being both a best response, and for being played with proba-
bility zero.
In the first case, we either have a Nash equilibrium, or else we have assigned
probability zero to all strategies. In the second case, it can be shown that there
are two “pivot” operations that we may perform, that remove one of the duplicate
labels of the doubly-labelled strategy, and add a label to some alternative strategy;
see von Stengel [65] for details. These operations correspond to following edges
on a degree-2 graph.
Viewed as a homotopy method (see Herings and Peeters [44] Section 4.1) the
algorithm works as follows. For a n× n game G with players 1 and 2, choose any
i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ [n] and give player i a large bonus payoff for using strategy aij ;
the bonus should be large enough to make aij a dominating strategy for player i.
Hence, there is a unique Nash equilibrium consisting of pure-strategy aij together
with the pure best response to aij . Now, we reduce that bonus to zero, and the
equilibrium should change continuously; however, the requirement that we keep
track of a continuously changing equilibrium means that in general, the bonus
cannot reduce monotonically to zero; it may have to go up as well as down.
The choice of aij at the start of the homotopy corresponds to the initial “dropped
label” in the discrete path-following description.
Figure 9: Two views of the Lemke-Howson algorithm
Savani and von Stengel [61] established earlier that the Lemke-Howson does in-
deed take exponentially many steps in the worst case; this new result, then, says
that moreover there are no “short cuts” to the solution obtained by Lemke-Howson,
subject only to the very weak assumption that PSPACE-hard problems require
exponential time in the worst case. (The PPAD-hardness of Nash already estab-
lished that these solutions are hard to find subject to the hardness of PPAD, but
the hardness of PPAD is a stronger assumption.)
Proof (the main ideas) Recall the role of discrete Brouwer functions in the reduc-
tions from End of the line to Nash, as discussed in Section 4. Suppose G = G1
is associated with a discrete Brouwer function having the kind of structure indi-
cated in Figure 5; the bottom left-hand corner looks roughly like the top right-hand
“t = 1” diagram in Figure 10. Suppose that G0 is associated with a DBF in which
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t=1/2 t=3/4
t=1t=0
Figure 10: Homotopy for Brouwer function in the plane
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the line-encoding structure has been stripped out: the top left “t = 0” diagram in
Figure 10.
Consider the linear homotopy between the corresponding continuous Brouwer
functions F0 and F1; Ft(x) = (1− t)F0(x) +F1(x). Ft colours the square according
to the direction of Ft(x)−x. Figure 10 (the bottom half) shows how these colourings
may evolve for intermediate values of t. For intermediate values of t, in regions where
F0 = F1 we have Ft(x) = F0(x) = F1(x) for all t. This means that fixpoints of
Ft cannot be located in the region where F1 gets the colour 0 (or black). So, a
continuous path of fixpoints necessarily follows the line of non-black regions of F1,
and necessarily ends up at the end of that particular line. The crossover gadget
(Figure 6) would break this correspondence with Oeotl; we fix that by moving to
3-dimensions, where the gadget is not needed. 
8 From Games to Markets
The PPAD-completeness results for variants of Nash has led, more recently, to
PPAD-completeness results for the problems of computing certain types of market
equilibria. We continue by giving the general idea and intuition, then we proceed
to the formal definitions. For more details on the background to this topic, see
Chapters 5,6 of [55]; here we aim to focus on giving a brief overview of more recent
PPAD-completeness results.
Suppose we have a set G of goods and a set T of traders. Each trader i in T has a
utility function f i that maps bundles of goods to non-negative real values. Assume
the goods are divisible, so f i is a mapping from vectors of non-negative numbers
(the quantity of each good in a bundle) to non-negative real numbers. A standard
assumption is that f i should be continuous, and non-decreasing when restricted to
an individual good (it doesn’t hurt to receive a bigger quantity), and concave (there
is non-increasing marginal utility). Now, suppose that each good j gets a (non-
negative real) unit price pj . A trader with some given budget can then identify
(from f i) the optimal bundle of goods that his budget will purchase (where optimal
bundles need not be unique). In general, the aim is to identify prices for goods such
that each trader can exchange an initial allocation for an optimal one that has the
same total price, so that the total quantity of each good is conserved. Under some
fairly mild conditions, it can be shown that such prices always exist. Intuitively, if
all traders try to exchange their initial allocations for ones that are optimal, and
there is too much demand for good j as a result, then we can fix that problem by
raising the price of j.
Definition 8.1 In an Arrow-Debreu market [3], each trader has an initial endow-
ment consisting of a bundle of goods. Suppose that the prices are set such that the
following can happen: each trader exchanges his endowment for an optimal bundle
having the same total value, and furthermore, the total quantity of each good is
conserved. In that case, we say that these prices allow the market to clear. It is
shown in [3] that there always exist prices that allow the market to clear.
A Fisher market is a special case of an Arrow-Debreu market, in which traders
are initially endowed with quantities of money, and there are fixed quantities of
goods for sale; in this case the prices should ensure that if each trader buys a bundle
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of goods that is optimal for his budget, then all goods are sold. This can be seen to
be a special case of Arrow-Debreu market, by regarding money as one of the goods
in G.
The existence proof of market-clearing prices [3] works by expressing a market
satisfying the relevant constraints in terms of an abstract economy, a generalisation
of the standard notion of a game, and applying Nash’s theorem. So, indirectly the
proof uses Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. This indicates that PPAD is the relevant
complexity class for studying the hardness of computing a price equilibrium. Results
about the computational complexity of finding market-clearing prices are in terms
of the types of utility functions of the traders.
Interesting classes of utility functions include the following (where (x1, . . . , xm)
denotes a vector of quantities of m goods):
1. Additively separable functions, where a trader’s function f i(x1, . . . , xm) is of
the form f i(x1, . . . , xm) =
∑m
j=1 f
i
j(xj). We still need to specify the structure
of the functions f ij in order to have a well-defined problem.
2. piecewise linear: in conjunction with additively separable, this would require
that each function f ij(xj) be piecewise linear, and the syntactic complexity of
such a function would be the total number of pieces of the functions f ij . More
generally, without the additively separable property, f i could take the form
f i(x1, . . . , xm) = mina∈A f ia(x1, . . . , xm) where A indexes a finite set of linear
functions, and f ia(x1, . . . , xm) =
∑m
j=1 λ
a
jxj for non-negative coefficients λ
a
j .
3. Leontiev economies: In a Leontiev economy we have f i(x1, . . . , xm) = minj∈[m] λijxj ,
a special case of the piecewise linear functions above; note that these functions
are not however additively separable.
Polynomial-time algorithms Linear utility functions take the form f i(x1, . . . , xm) =∑m
j=1 λ
i
jxj — they are both additively separable and piecewise linear, but not Leon-
tiev; they were initially considered in [34], and are known to be solvable in polynomial
time [28, 46] in the case of Fisher markets. For the Arrow-Debreu case, Devanur
and Vazirani [29] give a strongly polynomial-time approximation scheme but leave
open the problem of finding an exact one in polynomial time.
PPAD-hardness results The first such result applied to Leontiev economies, for
which there is a reduction from 2-player games [17]. Chen et al. [9] show that it
is PPAD-complete to compute an Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium for the case
of additively separable, piecewise linear and concave utility functions. Chen and
Teng [15] show that it is PPAD-hard to compute Fisher equilibrium prices, from
utility functions that are additively separable and piecewise linear concave; this
is done by reduction from Sparse bimatrix [14]. Vazirani and Yannakakis [66]
show that finding an equilibrium in Fisher markets is PPAD-hard in the case of
additively-separable, piecewise-linear, concave utility functions. On the positive
side, they show that with these utility functions, market equilibria can however be
written down with rational numbers.
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